Analyzing the Relationship Between Wartime Casualties and Violent Protest in the U.S. During the Vietnam War

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Abstract

The purpose of this study was to better understand the role casualty aversion played in the wave of guerrilla acts of sabotage and insurrection seen in America during the Vietnam War era. Studies have already shown the link between increased local casualties and the formation of negative opinions of a war. It was anticipated this link also existed in the extreme expressions of anti-war opinion: violent and destructive acts of sabotage or insurrection. Linear regression was used to analyze the relationship between casualties per capita and violent incidents per capita at the county level to conclude to what extent local casualty rates might have motivated violent acts. Regression analyses were followed up with a One-Way Analysis of Variance test. Maps visualizing casualties and violent incidents were produced to compliment statistical analyses. Results suggest counties with higher casualties per capita tended to experience moderately higher numbers of violent incidents per capita during certain years of the war as well as overall.

Introduction

Significance of Research

American scholars have shown reluctance in acknowledging the role of violence that accompanies social movements and protest movements (Piven, 2012). Piven attributes this to the many scholars who identify and sympathize with popular non-violent protest movements such as the Civil Rights movement. Sympathies aside, Piven suggests to ignore the violence associated with protest is to accept a distortion of the reality of historical experience. This violence must, therefore, be acknowledged and examined.

In discussing the implications of their research on the influence of race and casualty sensitivity in the formation of opinions on war, Gartner and Segura (2000) explain past understanding of this sort of influence has been largely based on anecdotes and inferential leaps. Sure enough, the results of their systematic analysis of the issue defy conventional wisdom. The findings of the study hold relevance in the context of current and future military interventions by the U.S. and the nationwide movement against racism and police brutality. It behooves political leaders, policy-makers, representatives, and constituents to better understand the extreme backlashes resulting from military interventions and issues of civil inequalities, without which there would be no basis for protest.

Background

Guerrilla War
Both Hinckle (1971) and Oppenheimer (1969) refer to the wave of left-wing violence in America collectively as guerrilla war. Hinckle (1971) says guerrilla war differs from old-fashioned terrorism or simplistic hooliganism. Oppenheimer includes the term guerrilla, along with partisan, irregular, and insurgent, under the blanket term “paramilitary warfare,” that is, organized, usually violent, behavior directed defensively or offensively against the dominant powers in society (e.g., police, military) by military elements associated with no regular or recognized government. It implies some political goal (unlike banditry or gangsterism) and may include a range of activities such as terrorism conspiracy (i.e., coup d’état), or a rebellion which might seek the seizure of the government or the overturn of the social order (Oppenheimer, 1969). The first U.S. military advisors were sent to Vietnam in 1955. By March 1965 there were 25,000 advisors in Vietnam and guerrilla attacks started happening (Figure 1). Attacks began increasing substantially following the bloodiest months of the war in early 1968 (Figure 2), and the number of attacks rose to a crescendo in May of 1970.

It can be seen in Figure 1 that anti-war movements were well underway before the guerrilla attacks became numerous. Anti-war marches drew tens of thousands of people nationwide in the United States, and the same was true in many other countries around the world. The anti-war movement was a grassroots movement that emerged in response to the Vietnam War and gained momentum as the conflict escalated. The movement included a wide range of supporters, from university students to former military personnel, who engaged in civil disobedience, protests, and direct actions to challenge the war. 
thousands and campus demonstrations happened in a number of major U.S. cities, in many cases being met with violent repression and campus bans. In 1968, the situation reached a boiling point, and the guerilla war in America began to take off (Figure 2). The North Vietnamese launched the “Tet Offensive” and U.S. casualties reached their highest point. Martin Luther King Jr. and Robert Kennedy were assassinated.

As repression continued on with large, peaceful antiwar demonstrations, guerilla attacks doubled from 1968 to 1969. By May 1970, the Weathermen (a militant, radical-left group) had gone underground, campuses experienced rioting, Ohio National Guard killed four student demonstrators in the Kent State Massacre, and guerilla attacks peaked.

The “New Left”

Rucht (2012) tells of the rise of the New Left and student movements in the 1960s in which groups engaged in issues ranging from the democratization of the universities to press concentration to the ending of the war in Vietnam. The New Left movement produced violent protest and ultimately acts of left-wing terrorism.

Describing the New Left, Oppenheimer (1969) says the idea was of daily practice creating ideology. “[Y]ou created the revolution first and learned from it, learned of what your revolution might consist and where it might go out of the intimate truth of the way it presented itself to your experience” (p.58).

Oppenheimer (1969) contrasts the New

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**Figure 2.** The timeline shows the monthly tally of guerilla attacks in the U.S., U.S. casualties in Vietnam, and a list concurrent events related to the war and the anti-war movement from 1968 through August 1970.

Left with the traditional Marxist left (whether communist, Trotskyist, or socialist), who have typically proceeded in a deductive and logical fashion in detailing program frameworks. Oppenheimer (1969) criticizes the New Left’s worship of action for the sake of action, their support of feeling over rational thought, and their generalized attack on the Western tradition. Again, Oppenheimer (1969) contrasts this with the Marxist, who attacks specific aspects of Western thought. The idea of, “action for the sake of action,” significant in the New Left movement tends to glorify violence for its own sake. The personality and organization of violence, far from therapeutic, endangers (if not utterly destroys) the humanistic component of a social movement (Oppenheimer, 1969).

“Latinization”

Hinkle (1971) and Oppenheimer (1969) both allude to the influence of Latin American guerrilla movements on the American guerrilla movement.

In addition to brief mention of the Cuban guerrilla Che Guevara, Hinkle (1971) says the Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla, written by Brazilian guerrilla theorist Carlos Marighella, is a prized textbook by American guerrillas. Tactics are geared to what Merighella calls “armed propaganda” serving a political and psychological purpose in singling out “enemies” while embarrassing the government who is unable to catch the perpetrators (Hinkle).

When Irving Louis Horowitz and Martin Liebowitz talk about “Latinization” of black riots and student revolts, they mean the line between crime and marginal politics is blurred (Oppenheimer, 1969).

Related to this guerrilla current is the Latin American concept of machismo, or manliness. Irving Louis Horowitz says the guerrilla mystique lies in “virility in speech, action, and dress, virility expressed by bravado, courage, and ruthlessness” (Oppenheimer, 1969, p.63).

American Guerrillas, Black and White

Hinkle (1971) describes American guerrillas in two broad ethnic, socio-economic groups. To call them black and white is “an over-simplification, but not a heinous one” (p.8). Their status as guerrillas and their choices of targets grew out of their economic and social conditions.

Oppenheimer (1969) quotes I. F. Stone who, on August 19, 1968, commented, “We must be prepared to see first of all that we face a black revolt; secondly, that the black ghettos regard the white police as an occupying army; thirdly, that guerrilla war against this army has begun…The effect of the ambushes which have begun to occur in various cities is to deepen police hatred…and therefore to stimulate those very excesses and brutalities which have made the police a hated enemy” (p.102). Similarly, Hinkle (1971) says black guerrillas viewed the police as the representatives of their colonial oppressor, and carried out the majority of attacks on police.

Hinkle (1971) explains while white revolutionaries, too, saw the police as “shock troops of the enemy,” (p.8) the typical white guerrilla was middle-to-upper-class, college or dropout age and largely operated from communities around college campuses. Their primary target was the college, and increasingly, the high school. Next were military targets, especially ROTC buildings on campus and Selective Service offices off campus (Hinkle).

Purpose of the Study
In the January 1971 issue of Scanlan’s Monthly, the short-lived New Left political/counter-cultural magazine responsible for the guerrilla violence data used in the study, Hinckle (1971) writes, “To understand guerrilla war is not to endorse it; not to understand it is to make it inevitable” (p.4). The issue was boycotted by printers and suppressed by authorities in the U.S. because it was perceived to be un-American, but the data it provided is essential evidence for understanding the American guerrilla movement during the Vietnam War.

The purpose of the study was to better understand how the human cost of war might contribute to rebellion against authority, and to suggest, as Raymond Postage does, that, “the army and police consist of people of high character who are misused in attacking the unemployed and suppressing black nationalists” (Oppenheimer, 1969, p.97). This notion is easily extended to include the violent repression used against: the Vietnam era antiwar movement in the U.S., the people’s struggle for self-determination in Vietnam, and contemporary popular protest movements like Occupy and Black Lives Matter. Oppenheimer (1969) explains this approach is diametrically opposed to the confrontational strategy of isolating the police by labeling them “pigs.” Confrontational strategy is detrimental because it helps the enforcers confirm their image of the opposition as a low, vile group worthy only of being smashed by batons (Oppenheimer, 1969).

**Methods**

**Violent Incidents Data**

**Background**

The list of violent incidents was compiled by researchers at Scanlan’s Monthly during an independent research project into the scope of guerrilla war in the U.S. Hinckle (1971) details the process: They searched all daily and Sunday editions of seventeen major daily newspapers from 1965 through 1970. Researchers also studied the underground press and private sources like the Lemburg Center for the Study of Violence at Brandeis University. Incidents found that were not also reported in a daily newspaper were independently verified or else forgotten. The purpose was to document guerrilla actions that clearly employed urban guerrilla techniques of Latin America. They eliminated many individual incidents related to major urban riots, although riots sustained by heavy guerrilla actions, like Watts, were mentioned. They ignored any attack with origins in the [berserk], criminal or right-wing—e.g., the bombing of a synagogue. Only actions that were clearly left wing and utilized guerrilla tactics were included. When political motivation could not be ascertained, the incident was left out.

**Description**

Incidents listed in Scanlan’s Monthly provided a date, city, state, a “target” category, a “method” category, and a text description of the incident. The earliest incident recorded was in February 1965, and the latest in August 1970.

**Target categories included Government Buildings, Corporations, Homes, High Schools/Elementary Schools, Colleges, Police, and Military.**
Descriptions of many incidents categorized under Colleges and Military specified the targeting of Reserve Officers’ Training Corps buildings. A query of “ROTC” in the text description field was performed to enable an additional test on those incidents as a group after testing them in their original categories.

Method categories included Sniping, Bomb/Dynamite, Time Bomb, Arson, Molotov Cocktail, and Terrorism. Figure 3 shows the category symbology used in the list.

While the other category names are straightforward, “Terrorism” as a category name presented a semantic problem. Stillman (2003) states defining terrorism is notoriously difficult because it holds contradictory definitions influenced by politics, location, and perspective. Further, Stillman explains, since September 11, “terrorism” has remained almost entirely a word of abuse or vilification in American political discourse, directly opposed to words that represent good. Before September 11, the word was used, “in a loose, figurative, or metaphorical sense: whenever there was an attempt at intimidation or disruption, there was terrorism” (Stillman, 2003, p.85). In the pre-September 11 context, it seemed the report used ‘terrorism’ as a loose category for incidents that did not fit well within another method category. Descriptions in this category were varied: vandalism, sabotage, physical attacks, looting, rioting, or even combinations of methods, e.g. an attack with Molotov cocktails and sniping. ‘Insurrection,’ rather than Terrorism, more aptly describes this category.

Data Preparation

A custom Google Form facilitated data entry from magazine to spreadsheet. For the regression analysis, incidents were aggregated at the county level and
normalized by 1970 county population. To aggregate at the county level, it was necessary to join county names by matching city and state names from a comprehensive list of cities, counties and states.

The map in Figure 4 shows total incidents per county. In Figure 5, maps show number of incidents per county by year. The maps in Figure 6 show incidents per county by Target. The maps in Figure 7 show incidents per county by Method.

Table 1 summarizes incidents by Target and Method categories over time, for years 1965 through August 1970. Table 2 summarizes the amount of each method used against each target category.

Irregularities

When a range of dates was given, the incident was entered once under the first date in the range. For example, an incident listed as,”11-16 Aug. 1965,” was entered as “8/11/1965.”

If a target or method symbol was not present, or was directly contradicted by the event description, the target or method category was added or revised based on the description. If the description confirmed the labels used, but mentioned additional target or method types, the original categories were maintained.

When a city name was missing, e.g. only the county name was given – either the nearest city or the county seat was determined and entered as a placeholder.

One incident took place on the “High Seas,” and a handful of incidents in Puerto Rico were excluded in the analysis. A single indecent occurring in Alaska was included in the analysis but is not represented in Figures 4-7.
Table 1. Summary of violent incidents by Target and Method categories over time, for years 1965 through August 1970.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Homes</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROTC Buildings*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Buildings</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary &amp; High Schools</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporations</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colleges</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>16</strong></td>
<td><strong>35</strong></td>
<td><strong>56</strong></td>
<td><strong>234</strong></td>
<td><strong>511</strong></td>
<td><strong>543</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,395</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*ROTC incidents are not counted in the totals because three of these attacks were categorized and counted under Military and the rest under Colleges.

Table 2. Summary of the amount of each method used against each target category.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time Bomb</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurrection</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sniping</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arson</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molotov Cocktail</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bomb or Dynamite</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>16</strong></td>
<td><strong>35</strong></td>
<td><strong>56</strong></td>
<td><strong>234</strong></td>
<td><strong>511</strong></td>
<td><strong>543</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,395</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*ROTC incidents are not counted in the totals on the right because three of these attacks were categorized and counted under Military and the rest under Colleges.
Figure 5. Maps show all incidents of guerrilla sabotage and insurrection in the contiguous U.S. by year, from 1965 through August 1970. Graduated red dot symbols represent total casualties by county.
Figure 6. Maps show all incidents of guerrilla sabotage and insurrection in the contiguous U.S. by Target category, from 1965 through August 1970. Graduated red dot symbols represent total casualties by county.
Figure 7. Maps show all incidents of guerrilla sabotage and insurrection in the contiguous U.S. by Method category, from 1965 - August 1970. Graduated red dot symbols represent total casualties by county.
**Casualty Data**

Description

Each record, a single casualty, provided the individual’s home county/state, and date of death. Casualties occurring after the latest violent incident, i.e. after August 1970, were excluded from the analysis. Table 3 summarizes casualties by year, from 1956 through August 1970. The map in Figure 8 shows total casualties per county through August 1970. Figure 9 consists of maps showing casualties per county by years, from 1956 through August 1970.

For the regression analysis, casualties were aggregated at the county level and normalized by 1970 population.

Table 3. The table shows total number of Vietnam War casualties (U.S.) per year, 1956 - August 1970.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Casualties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956 - 1964</td>
<td>415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1,828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>6,038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>10,875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>16,083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>11,211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>4,636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>50,671</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Irregularities

A handful of entries lacked record of the casualty’s home county listing only the home state. These casualties were excluded in the analysis. Casualties hailing from outside the U.S. were excluded.

Figure 8. This map shows all U.S. casualties of the Vietnam War from 1956 through August 1970. Graduated red dot symbols represent total casualties by county.
Figure 9. These maps show all U.S. casualties of the Vietnam War by year, from 1956 through August 1970. Graduated red dot symbols represent total casualties by county.
**Population Data**

Generally speaking, raw totals of both casualties and incidents were a function of population. Metropolitan areas like New York City, Chicago, Los Angeles and the Bay Area experienced the highest numbers of each, less-populated areas experienced fewer of each.

For the analysis, incidents and casualties were normalized by 1970 county population. For reasons unknown, Adams County, Wisconsin was missing from the population dataset. Figure 10 shows 1970 population density by county.

**Linear Regression Analysis**

Statistical analysis was performed using SPSS Statistics software. Linear regression tests were conducted on counties in which violent incident(s) occurred to analyze the relationship between casualties per capita (the independent variable) and violent incidents per capita (the dependent variable) to conclude to what extent local casualty rates might have motivated violent acts.

The first test analyzed all counties where incident(s) occurred from 1965 through August 1970, to describe the relationship between cumulative casualties per capita of the Vietnam conflict through August 1970 (the earliest of which are from 1956), and cumulative violent incidents 1965 through August 1970.

Additional tests were performed on halves and quarters of the first test group, sorting the counties by casualties per capita then by incidents per capita.

Further tests were performed on counties with incident(s) of each category.

![Figure 10. The map shows 1970 population density of U.S. counties, i.e. total county population normalized by county area in square miles. Major U.S. cities are labeled for reference.](image-url)
of targets and methods. Again, casualties and incidents per capita were cumulative through August 1970.

Finally, tests were performed on counties experiencing incident(s), not cumulative, but by year, for each year from 1965 through 1970. In these tests, casualties and incidents per capita were calculated with casualties and incidents of the respective year only.

**ANOVA**

Regression tests were followed by two One-Way Analysis of Variance tests. The purpose was to identify any statistically significant differences in mean incidents per capita amongst halves, then amongst quartiles of counties by casualties per capita (Figure 11). Whisker-box plots representing the quartiles are shown in Figure 12.

![Mean Incidents Per 100K](Image)

**Figure 11.** The chart shows mean county incidents per capita for quartile groups of counties sorted by casualties per capita.

**Results**

**Linear Regression Analysis**

The test result for all counties where incidents occurred was not significant. Further testing of quantile divisions of counties sorted by casualties per capita yielded significant results in some cases. For counties above the median and counties in the fourth quartile, tests indicated a highly significant ($p \leq .005$) positive correlation. When casualties per capita

![County Incidents Per 100K](Image)

**Figure 12.** The chart shows a whisker-box plot of county incidents per capita for each quartile of counties sorted by casualties per capita (quartile 1 has fewest, quartile 4 has most). Outlier county labels indicate the county’s rank by casualties per capita, with number 1 having the fewest casualties, and number 300 the most.
capita increased, incidents per capita also increased. For counties below the median and counties in the first quartile, tests indicated a significant (p ≤ .05) negative correlation, i.e. when casualties per capita increased, incidents per capita decreased. A scatterplot with regression line is shown for each of these models in Figure 13. The maps in Figure 14 show the locations of counties in these quantile groups.

Testing quantile divisions of the counties sorted by incidents per capita yielded no statistically significant results. Tests of counties with incident(s) of each Target and Method type yielded significant results in three cases: A positive correlation was indicated for counties with incidents targeting Police, and for counties with incidents of sniping and time bombs.

Tests performed for individual years 1965 through 1970 yielded four statistically significant results indicating a positive correlation: years 1966, 1967, 1969, and 1970. All regression test results are summarized in Appendix A.

ANOVA

One-way Analysis of Variance tests indicated no statistically significant differences in mean incidents per capita.

Figure 13. Scatterplots showing U.S. counties by Vietnam War casualties per capita and violent incidents per capita through August 1970. The boxes on top contain all counties, grouped below (top left) and above (top right) the median. Counties within the inter-quartile range are black dots. The bottom boxes contain only counties in casualty quartiles one (bottom left, blue dots) and four (bottom right, red dots). The regression lines in each box are statistically significant.
amongst halves or amongst quartiles of counties by casualties per capita.
Figure 14. The maps show U.S. counties where violent incident(s) occurred, by fewest (yellow) to most (blue) incidents per capita. The upper and lower maps show those counties falling above and below the median casualties (through August 1970) per capita, respectively. 4th and 1st quartile counties are labeled ‘4’ and ‘1’, respectively.
Discussion

Studies have already shown the link between increased local casualties and the formation of negative opinions of a war. It was anticipated that this link also existed in the most extreme expressions of anti-war and anti-establishment opinion during the Vietnam War: violent and destructive acts of sabotage or insurrection.

Results of linear regression tests performed on the upper half and top quarter of counties by casualties per capita indicated a statistically significant positive correlation between casualties per capita and violent incidents per capita. These models explained 7.0% and 11.0%, respectively, of variability in the data. On the other hand, tests on the lower half and bottom quarter indicated a significant negative correlation between casualties and incidents. These models explained 4.1% and 6.9%, respectively, of variability in the data. Models testing counties of greater casualties per capita suggested the correlation that was anticipated, while the models testing counties of fewer casualties suggested the opposite.

While regression analyses indicated a statistically significant effect of casualties on protest incidents within halves and quartiles of counties by casualties, ANOVA analyses indicated no statistically significant differences in mean incidents between those groups. Note, in Figure 12 the distribution of incidents per capita among counties had positive skew with many outliers at the top.

Future study could explore counties by regions or states. Note in Figure 14 the locations of counties tested that were above the median casualties per capita versus those below. The American south was well represented above the median, while few counties in the northeastern states are present. Most northeastern counties were below the median. Clusters of high-incident (blue), top-casualty quartile (‘4’) counties seen in Kentucky, Ohio, southern Illinois, and Georgia are areas of interest as they confirm the anticipated trend. On the other hand, clusters of high-incident (blue) and bottom casualty quartile (‘1’) counties are of interest for contradicting the anticipated trend: in Indiana, along the border of Louisiana and Mississippi, and surrounding Denver, Colorado.

Testing of counties with attacks against police and those with sniping attacks yielded significant positive correlation between casualties and incidents per capita. The models explained 5.5% and 5.3%, respectively, of variability in the data. Some things to note about these categories of attacks: As seen in Table 2, 217 of the 225 sniping attacks targeted police, and at 425 incidents total, police were the target of more attacks than any other target category. As seen in Table 1, the majority of these attacks occurred in the latter years of the study, 1968-1970. Interestingly, while many attacks against police occurred in major cities across the U.S. (Figure 6), sniping attacks appear to have been relatively more numerous in Chicago and St. Louis compared to the west coast or northeast metropolises (Figure 7). This strain of incidents warrants further study, especially within the context of the ethnic, economic, and social dimensions among guerrillas as described by Hinckle (1971).

A significant correlation was indicated between casualties per capita and time bomb attacks per capita in counties where time bomb attacks occurred. The model explains a striking 49.6% of variability in the data. It should be noted
only 13 counties experienced such attacks and were included in the test, meaning this model had the fewest counties to test. At 25 incidents, time bombs were the least reported method category (Table 1).

Tests performed for individual years 1965 through 1970 indicated significant positive correlations in four of those six years. The model for 1967 was particularly significant, explaining 48% of variability in the data. The success of these tests might be explained by what Gartner and Segura, 1998, demonstrated, as cited in Gartner and Segura (2000) how heightened rates of spatially and temporally (my emphasis) proximal casualties can provide even greater explanatory power for [negative] opinions than cumulative national casualties. Continuing on this notion, Gartner says rating casualty counts by proximity (in both time and space) is important, because logging cumulative casualties masks variations and patterns in casualty accrual (Gartner, 2008).

Further, a weakness made evident in Figure 14 is that counties tested were effectively dissected from adjacent or neighboring counties and their respective, potentially influential, casualty levels. Future analyses in this realm could benefit from more refined methods of estimating both spatial and temporal proximity of casualties to incidents.

Potential explanatory dimensions discussed earlier and worth exploring in future analyses might include: racial composition, wealth and poverty, police violence, and the presence and activity of political groups in communities.

Conclusions

Piven (2012) attributes the reluctance among America scholars in acknowledging the role of violence accompanying social movements and protest movements to the fact that many scholars identify and sympathize with popular non-violent protest movements, such as the Civil Rights movement. Sympathies aside, Piven suggests to ignore the violence associated with protest is to accept a distortion of the reality of historical experience. Hinckle (1971) writes, “To understand guerrilla war is not to endorse it; not to understand it is to make it inevitable” (p.4).

It is hoped this study might shed some light on this wave of guerrilla violence in America, which has been largely omitted in popular historical accounts and understandings of the Vietnam War era.

Results of the statistical analysis of the link between Vietnam War casualties and the wave of left-wing violence seen at that time in the U.S. indicate some tendency of counties with higher casualties per capita to also experience higher violent incidents per capita. Some popular understandings cast anti-war protests as anti-soldier or anti-veteran, and therefore as occurring out of lack of sympathy for those fighting and dying in the war. However, aversion to the casualties of the war (along with racial oppression and the repression against peaceful movements) seems to have been very much at play in the violent backlash against authority. While the statistical results should not be overstated, further study into this topic is warranted.

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Thanks to the National Historical Geographic Information System at the Minnesota Population Center (2011) for providing county population data from the 1970 census. Casualty data was acquired from the National Archives.

Event information for the timeline figures was found in the timeline at The Pacifica Radio / UC Berkeley Social Activism Sound Recording Project: Anti-Vietnam War Protests in the San Francisco Bay Area & Beyond.

References


Appendix A. The table summarizes the results of linear regression tests performed on counties where violent incident(s) occurred. Statistically significant results ($p \leq .05$) are high-lighted in grey.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Counties (N)</th>
<th>Test Group</th>
<th>Mean Casualties per 100K</th>
<th>Mean Incidents per 100K</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>R-Squared</th>
<th>% of Variability Explained by Model</th>
<th>P-Value, Significant at $p \leq .05$</th>
<th>Slope</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All counties with incident(s) of violence</td>
<td></td>
<td>25.06</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>0.144</td>
<td>0.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counties by quantiles: Casualties per capita</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>151 Above median</td>
<td></td>
<td>32.57</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>0.265</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>151 Below median</td>
<td></td>
<td>17.55</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>0.202</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>-0.095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75 Quartile 4</td>
<td></td>
<td>37.85</td>
<td>3.05</td>
<td>0.331</td>
<td>0.110</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75 Quartile 3</td>
<td></td>
<td>27.31</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.799</td>
<td>0.057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75 Quartile 2</td>
<td></td>
<td>21.97</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.729</td>
<td>-0.077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75 Quartile 1</td>
<td></td>
<td>13.11</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>0.262</td>
<td>0.069</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>-0.138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counties by quantiles: Incidents per capita</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>151 Above median</td>
<td></td>
<td>25.59</td>
<td>4.28</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0.384</td>
<td>0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>151 Below median</td>
<td></td>
<td>24.53</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.222</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.008</td>
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<tr>
<td>75 Quartile 4</td>
<td></td>
<td>25.38</td>
<td>6.66</td>
<td>0.118</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>0.313</td>
<td>0.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75 Quartile 3</td>
<td></td>
<td>25.66</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>0.092</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>0.431</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75 Quartile 2</td>
<td></td>
<td>25.97</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.154</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>0.188</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75 Quartile 1</td>
<td></td>
<td>31.19</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.208</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counties with incident(s) by Target category</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104 Colleges</td>
<td></td>
<td>23.47</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.623</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95 Corporations</td>
<td></td>
<td>23.64</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.810</td>
<td>0.007</td>
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<tr>
<td>52 Government Buildings</td>
<td></td>
<td>25.50</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>0.207</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>0.141</td>
<td>0.040</td>
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<tr>
<td>45 Homes</td>
<td></td>
<td>24.36</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>0.385</td>
<td>0.056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53 Military</td>
<td></td>
<td>22.89</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.822</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132 Police</td>
<td></td>
<td>25.52</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>0.235</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69 Elementary &amp; High Schools</td>
<td></td>
<td>23.38</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.130</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>0.285</td>
<td>0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52 ROTC Buildings</td>
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<td>21.73</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>0.186</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>0.186</td>
<td>-0.025</td>
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<tr>
<td>Counties with incident(s) by Method category</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>95 Arson</td>
<td></td>
<td>21.91</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>0.079</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>0.446</td>
<td>0.024</td>
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<tr>
<td>136 Bomb or Dynamite</td>
<td></td>
<td>25.64</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>0.130</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td>0.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69 Insurrection</td>
<td></td>
<td>23.09</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0.646</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140 Molotov Cocktail</td>
<td></td>
<td>22.75</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.715</td>
<td>0.004</td>
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<tr>
<td>88 Sniping</td>
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<td>26.03</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>0.230</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Time Bomb</td>
<td></td>
<td>26.45</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>0.705</td>
<td>0.496</td>
<td>49.6%</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counties with incident(s) by year</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 1965</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>0.180</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>0.557</td>
<td>-0.289</td>
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<tr>
<td>25 1966</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.421</td>
<td>0.177</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.171</td>
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<tr>
<td>25 1967</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.48</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>0.693</td>
<td>0.480</td>
<td>48.0%</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95 1968</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.85</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.835</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>153 1969</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.23</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>0.187</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>180 1970 (through August)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>0.206</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.284</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>